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Abstract: The Data Warehouse (DW) design is based on multidimensional (MD)
modeling which structures information into facts and dimensions. Due to the conﬁ-
dentiality of the data that it stores, it is crucial to specify security and audit mea-
sures from the early stages of design and to enforce them throughout the lifecycle.
Moreover, the standard framework for software development, Model Driven Archi-
tecture (MDA), allows us to deﬁne transformations between models by proposing
Query/View/Transformations (QVT). This proposal permits the deﬁnition of formal,
elegant and unequivocal transformations between Platform Independent Models (PIM)
and Platform Speciﬁc Models (PSM). This paper introduces a new framework for the
design of secure DWs based on MDA and QVT, which covers all the design phases
(conceptual, logical and physical) and speciﬁes security measures in all of them. We
ﬁrst deﬁne two metamodels with which to represent security and audit measures at
the conceptual and logical levels. We then go on to deﬁne a transformation between
these models through which to obtain the traceability of the security rules from the
early stages of development to the ﬁnal implementation. Finally, in order to show the
beneﬁts of our proposal, it is applied to a case study.
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1 Introduction
The widespread development and application of digital technology, and its ex-
ponential take-up which began in the mid-1980s, have changed our way of
life [Grabosky (2007)]. Software is the biggest problem in computer security to-
day [McGraw (1999)]. Organizations have begun to adopt more and more com-
puterized information systems, which rely upon databases and DWs that require
increasingly more quality and security. DWs frequently store historical and ag-
gregated information, extracted from multiple heterogeneous, autonomous and
distributed information sources; therefore, the very survival of the organization
depends on the appropriate manipulation, security and conﬁdentiality of this
information [Dhillon and Backhouse (2000)].
In recent years DWs have received attention from both industry and the
academic world, but within DW projects, the security aspects are normally
implemented in the ﬁnal phases of design. However, information security is
a serious requirement which must be carefully considered, not as an isolated
aspect, but as an element which appears as an issue in all stages of the de-
velopment lifecycle, from requirements analysis to implementation and mainte-
nance [Devanbu and Stubblebine (2000)]. In present-day real world Data Ware-
house projects, the security rules are speciﬁed once the Data warehouse has
been implemented. Therefore, the security rules are speciﬁed on top of rela-
tional structures (major implementation platforms for Data Warehouses) such
as tables or columns. As a consequence, we obtain a huge number of security
rules that do not correctly satisfy the security requirements for ﬁnal users. This
is due to the fact that we do not have semantic multidimensional information
from these relational structures. For this reason (and as we will show through-
out this paper), we believe that if these security rules are speciﬁed on top of the
underlying multidimensional model of the Data Warehouse, it will be possible
to deﬁne the exact required security rules for every group of users as these rules
will be deﬁned based on the semantic relationship of the corresponding multidi-
mensional elements, which are the elements upon which the ﬁnal users’ queries
are based.
A new standard which addresses the complete life cycle of developing appli-
cations by using models in software development has recently appeared: Model
Driven Architecture (MDA) [Miller and Mukerji (2003)]. In MDA technology,
the standard for deﬁning transformations is Model Object Facility (MOF) 2.0
Query /Views/ Transformations (QVT) [OMG (2005)]. MDA promotes the spec-
iﬁcation of a Platform Independent Model (PIM) which does not contain speciﬁc
information about the platform or about the technology to be used to develop
it. This PIM can be transformed into one or several Platform Speciﬁc Models
(PSMs) by including platform and development technology speciﬁc information.
Later, each PSM is implemented in a code which will be executed on a platform
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in order to obtain the ﬁnal software product. Besides these models, a Compu-
tation Independent Model (CIM) is provided by MDA as a means of modeling
user requirements.
The QVT speciﬁcation has a hybrid declarative/ imperative nature, with the
declarative part being split into a two-level architecture [OMG (2005)]: Relations
and Core metamodels. In the relation metamodel, the model transformation
between model candidates is speciﬁed as a set of relations. These relations must
hold for a successful model transformation. In the imperative style, a Black-box
implementation of operations can also be used to allow the reuse of existing
algorithms or domain-speciﬁc libraries in certain model transformations.
Bearing these considerations in mind, we have previously proposed a pre-
liminary version of QVT relations between PIM and PSM [Soler et al., (2007)]
in the design of DWs which was validated through a case study presented
in [Soler et al., (2007a)]. The PIM allows us to represent security and audit
measures at the conceptual level for the DWs design, and is deﬁned by us-
ing the approaches of [Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006), Villarroel et al., (2006)].
Moreover, in [Soler et al., (2007b)] we presented a framework for the de-
velopment of secure DWs based on MDA which permits the consideration
of security issues in the MDA approach. Hence, our preliminary versions
of QVT relations and the MDA framework constitute a natural continua-
tion of the works of [Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006), Villarroel et al., (2006),
Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006a)] which only incorporate security requirements
in the DW design at the conceptual level.
In this paper, we signiﬁcantly improve and complete our prior approach
(previously-described) as follows: (i) we propose a new framework for the de-
sign of secure DWs (by means of MDA and QVT) by adopting a new di-
vision of the security space in software and application based on the ap-
proach proposed by McGraw in [McGraw (2002)], (ii) we provide a more in-
depth revision of the related work as a new section, structured into two sub-
sections which are focused on security in DWs and MDA and Security re-
spectively, (iii) we replace the preliminary versions of the PSM employed in
[Soler et al., (2007)] and [Soler et al., (2007b)] with a formalized extension pre-
sented in [Soler et al., (2008)] in order to consider the automatic generation of
Code in the both DBMS (Database Management Systems) and OLAP tools, (iv)
we include a new subsection with which to deﬁne relations that assure the trans-
formation between associations and foreign keys from PIM and PSM, and ﬁnally,
(v) we provide a new section explaining the current complexity of implementing
QVT and how commercial tools are used to transform all the security and audit
measures represented in the PSM into the corresponding code in both DBMS
and OLAP tools. Therefore, this paper constitutes a natural extension through
which to correctly complete our previous approach in the necessary manner. To
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the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst approach in the area of Data ware-
houses and OLAP which automatically generates the security rules deﬁned in
conceptual models in the ﬁnal implementation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related
work. Section 3 presents a framework for the development of secure DWs in which
we deﬁne, amongst other things, a Secure Multidimensional PIM (SMD PIM), a
Secure Multidimensional PSM Model (SMD PSM) and a set of QVT relations.
Section 4 uses a case study to show the application of our QVT relations. The
applicability and limitations of the Architecture proposed is discussed in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions and outlines future work.
2 Related Work
This section on related work begins with the main approaches dealing with
security in DWs. We then study work related to the integration of security
within the new MDA approach.
2.1 Security in DWs
The DW’s architecture is composed of several layers, and security is involves in
all layers and operations of the warehouse [Thuraisingham et al., (2007)]. The
ﬁrst layer contains the Data Sources (DS) which, through ETL process will feed
the data warehouse. The second layer is the DW model, which represents the
data structure that will support the information. The third layer contains the
tools which oﬀer automatic methods for analyzing, querying and mining the DS
data, and which are usually OLAP tools or Data Base Management Systems
(DBMS).
Firstly, since DS are heterogeneous and can use diﬀerent access control se-
curity policies (such as discretionary, mandatory or role-based access control),
the security problem in this layer is their integration into the DW design. DW
users will be diﬀerent from those of DS, so although an integrated security pol-
icy cannot be directly used in the DW as a ﬁnal security policy, it might be an
interesting starting point. Furthermore, since ETL processes extract and trans-
form information from DSs and ﬁnally load it into the DW, it is important that
ETL processes take security information into account. With regard to this layer,
the main proposals are related to the same problem studied for Federated Infor-
mation Systems (FIS) [Thuraisingham (1994)]; [Jajodia and Wijesekera (2001)].
One of the most interesting works is that of [Saltor et al., (2002)], in which this
parallelism is used to adapt a design architecture for FIS to DWs, and also
to improve it with security capabilities that support the integration of manda-
tory access control policies. However, we found very few modeling proposals
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relating to ETL processes, and those that we did ﬁnd did not consider security
[Trujillo and Luja´n-Mora (2003), Simitsis and Vassiliadis (2008)].
The DW model (second layer) is highly important, and is usually designed
through the deﬁnition of several models at diﬀerent abstraction levels (busi-
ness, multidimensional, logical and physical). Several works are focused on the
secure modeling of DWs at a certain abstraction level. At the business level
there are proposals based on ontologies, business process, UML, etc. Paim
and Castro [Paim and Castro (2003)] include security requirements, but they
do not oﬀer any formal metamodel. Furthermore, the Tropos methodology
[Giorgini et al., (2006)] considers the issues of security and trust as a part of
its development process. This methodology is based on social hierarchies and
adapts components of the i* framework to deﬁne the obligations of actors (de-
pendees) towards other actors (dependers). This proposal is improved with new
security concepts: constraints, secure entities (secure goals, tasks, resources, own-
ership) and secure dependences between actors (such as trust of execution, trust
of permission, delegation of permission and delegation of execution).
At the conceptual level there are interesting works for the modeling
of DWs which consider their special characteristics by using extensions
of the ER model, UML or their own notation, but they do not in-
clude security capabilities [Golfarelli et al., (1998)], [Sapia et al., (1998)],
[Tryfona et al., (1999)], [Binh et al., (2000)], [Abello´ et al., (2006)],
[Luja´n et al., (2006)], [Prat et al., (2006)]. The conceptual modeling of se-
curity issues is solely considered by the AdaptedUML of Priebe and Pernul
[Priebe and Pernul (2001)].
Logical modeling depends on the technology used (ROLAP, MOLAP, HO-
LAP, etc.). In [Katic et al., (1998)] the authors describe a prototype model for
DW security based on metadata, which enables the deﬁnition of views of data for
each group of users. However, this does not allow us to specify complex restric-
tions of conﬁdentiality. Rosenthal and Sciore [Rosenthal et al., (2000)] extend
SQL grants and create a mechanism of inferences through which to establish the
security of DWs, which gives permission to access the tables and views of the
system.
DBMS and OLAP tools have also considered security constraints in order
to avoid unauthorized accesses. In fact, the most popular tools integrate func-
tionality, which allows developers to specify security constraints. This is impor-
tant, but it is not a good solution from the engineering point of view, because
security, as with any other requirement, should be identiﬁed and modeled at
the moment of analysis and design, and should then be implemented in accor-
dance with this analysis and design. On the other hand, the inference problem
remains as a challenge in DW security and is an important research branch
[Thuraisingham et al., (2007)]. This problem is similar to the that previously
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studied, problem for statistical databases which store summarized data such as
sum or averages [Shoshani (1997)].
Finally, a global proposal exists which attempts to integrate security into
the complete DW development process [Priebe and Pernul (2001)], and which
is based on the classical database design methodology (requirement, analysis,
conceptual, logical, and physical design). This proposal covers requirements and
concrete implementations in SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS), creating a
Multidimensional Security Constraint Language (MDSCL) by extending multi-
dimensional expressions (MDX) with hide statements for cubes, measures, slices
and levels. The same authors extend the ADAPTed UML (which uses ADAPT
symbols as UML stereotypes) model for the previous conceptual phase, speci-
fying a methodology and a MD security constraint language for the conceptual
modeling of OLAP security. This proposal is extremely interesting, but although
roles are used, the authors do not use a role-base access control policy. They in-
clude a simpliﬁed role concept (without hierarchies) that represents a subject in a
discretional access control policy. Furthermore, they only hide multidimensional
elements without supporting the complex security constraints involving condi-
tional evaluation. Finally, this methodology does not establish the connection
between levels in order to permit automatic transformations.
2.2 MDA and Security
The use of Model Driven Development is one of the most intuitive strategies
through which to develop more secure information systems. However, the phi-
losophy of model driven engineering when applied to the development of secure
information systems is diﬀerent to that of traditional security models which
describe the protection needs of the systems. Security models are therefore em-
bedded in and scattered throughout the high level system models, meaning that
these integrated models can be transformed into implementation models accord-
ing to the MDA strategy.
Several works dealing with the integration of security with UML and other
modeling languages exist. One of the most relevant proposals is UMLsec
([Ju¨rjens (2002), Ju¨rjens (2004)]), which integrates security into the information
systems through UML and can be employed to specify and evaluate UML se-
curity speciﬁcations using formal semantics. Furthermore, [Burt et al., (2003)]
propose a PIM for several existing PSMs, but only over the description
of the transformations, and the work in general is devoted to access con-
trol patterns for an area related to Middleware and Grid Technologies. In
[Sivanandam and Karpagam (2004)] a schema appears through which to de-
sign and develop security services by using an MDA based approach which
takes the smart card as its application. This work helps in the development of
MDA Components for Security services in new and legacy systems. OpenPMF
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[Lang and Schreiner (2004)] is a technology framework based on MDS, which
allows the centralized, integrated management of security policies for complex
distributed systems.
A novel methodological approach for the model driven development of se-
cure XML databases (DB) can be found in [Vela et al., (2006)]. This pro-
posal is within the context of Web Information Systems based on MDA. A
tooling framework with which to generate Web service security conﬁgura-
tions by using MDA and Service-Orientated Architecture (SOA) appears in
[Nakamura et al., (2005)]. In [Hafner et al., (2006)] the authors propose a novel
approach based on MDA and MOF-QVT standards. Their approach is very in-
teresting, but refers only to the Global workﬂows that specify the message ﬂow
between a pattern distributed environment with no central control.
In SecureUML [Lodderstedt et al., (2002)], an approach through which to
include security in UML, the term Model Driven Security (MDS) appears for the
ﬁrst time. MDS ([Basin and Doser (2006)]) applies the MDA approach to include
security properties in high-level system models and uses tools to automatically
generate system architectures from the models, including security infrastructures
to automatically generate secure system architectures. The approach is very rich
but focuses exclusively on access control in the context of a platform which is
oriented towards logic applications and target objects (.NET and J2EE). MDS
extends MDA in three respects: i) the system models are enriched with primitives
and rules for integrating security into the development process, ii) the model
transformation techniques are extended to ensure that these security details
are also transformed, and iii) the system is obtained, including the security
properties and the corresponding security mechanisms. In order to fulﬁl this goal,
the authors consider dialects which provide a bridge by deﬁning the connection
points with which to integrate elements of the security modeling language with
elements of the system design modeling language.
Other applications of MDS also exist, such as that of
[Lang and Schreiner (2004), Hafner et al., (2006)], which clearly establishes
the PIM, the PSM and the necessary transformation between them, or the
MDS through UMLsec of [Best et al., (2007), Ju¨rjens et al., (2008)], which
deﬁnes three abstraction levels (requirements, models and code), and provides
both direct and reverse engineering, veriﬁcation, conﬁguration, etc., thanks
to a rich set of tools [Ju¨rjens and Shabalin (2007), Ju¨rjens (2009)], etc. All
these proposals are of great interest, and oﬀer great contributions towards the
development of more secure information systems, but none of them refers to the
development of secure DWs, which have diﬀerent security requirements, and a
diﬀerent development process.
In the following section we present the core of our proposal (A Framework for
the Development of Secure DWs). Our goal is attained through the integration
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of the proposal of [Mazo´n et al., (2008)] based on MDA and QVT with the MD
modeling of secure DWs [Villarroel et al., (2006)]. Within this context, we use as
our CIM model the work presented in [Soler et al., (2008a)], by applying the i*
framework to elicit both functional and security requirements for the DW design
at the business level. The PIM model corresponds to the extension presented in
[Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006)] and [Villarroel et al., (2006)], which is called
the Secure Data Warehouse (SECDW) metamodel. The PSM corresponds to the
extension of the Relational metamodel [Soler et al., (2008)] from the Common
Warehouse Metamodel (CWM) [OMG (2003)] at the logical level. The extended
metamodel is called Secure Relational Data Warehouse (SECRDW). The ﬁnal
section deals with the code generation for both DBMS and OLAP tools and with
the reverse engineering process of the framework proposed.
3 A Framework for the Development of Secure DWs
This section proposes a framework for the development of secure DWs, which
integrates MDA and QVT with the MD modeling of secure DWs (see Fig. 1).
We focus on deﬁning transformation T2 between a Secure Multidimensional PIM
(SMD PIM) and a Secure Multidimensional PSM (SMD PSM). Therefore, Sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2 introduce an SMD PIM and an SMD PSM. In Subsection 3.3
we deﬁne QVT relations between SMD PIM and SMD PSM, i.e, transformation
T2 in Fig. 1. Subsection 3.4 explains certain issues related to transformation T3.
Subsections 3.5 and 3.6 are devoted to the discussion of secure DWs implementa-
tion for DBMS (Oracle 11g) and OLAP tools. Finally, Subsection 3.7 introduces
the latest technical advances from OMG through which to carry out reverse
engineering.
MDA is based on building system-independent models and transforming
them into eﬃcient implementations. Hence, we need to choose metamodels whose
instances will serve as PIM and PSM. We moreover deﬁne a transformation
between them. Fig. 1 uses a diagram to illustrate our Secure multidimensional
MDA framework for the development of secure DWs. The upper section presents
the CIM which deﬁnes both functional and non functional requirements for the
DWs. It represents a perspective of the DW within its business environment and
thus plays an important role in reducing the gap between those who are experts
in the domain and their requirements and those who are experts in the design
and development of the DW, which needs to satisfy these requirements.
The transformation T1 in Fig. 1 is used to map SMD CIM into SMD PIM.
The use of formal languages to capture the key business activities is too complex
for analysts and requirements engineers. The modeling of the CIM with no formal
languages entails ambiguity in the CIM’s deﬁnition. That makes the formal
transformation from CIM to PIM (transformation T1) diﬃcult. We are currently
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Figure 1: A Framework for the Development Secure DWs.
working on the transformation T1, but it has not yed been developed due to its
complexity. According to MDA, several PSMs can be transformed from a PIM.
Therefore, our secure relational platform (SECRDW) is represented on the left
hand side of the area corresponding to the logical level, while any other secure
PSMs are represented on the right hand side of the same area. By secure PSM
we understand a PSM whose metamodel supports the security modeling at the
logical level. Consider as an example, an extension for modeling security issues
for the Multidimensional metamodel from CWM. The right hand side of Fig. 1
can therefore represent a secure Multidimensional Online Analytical Processing
(MOLAP) PSM. Hence, transformation T2 allows us to derive an SMD PSM or
other secure PSMs.
Starting from each SMD PSM, the corresponding code is derived for the tar-
get platform, which corresponds to ours at the physical level. This code is called
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a Secure Multidimensional Code, (SMD Code) and it is represented in the lower
section of Fig. 1 by using transformation T3. Note that the security restriction
deﬁned by using OCL (represented as a UML note) is transformed from the
conceptual level to the logical level by means of T2, and is later transformed into
code by means of T3.
3.1 Definition of the SMD PIM
The SECDW metamodel allows us to represent the main security requirements
for the conceptual modeling of the DWs. Fig. 2 represents the SECDW meta-
model, and its instances are modeled through the secureDW class. Both se-
cureDW and certain attributes are omitted to make the metamodel more com-
prehensible.
SecureProperty
securitylevels : Levels
securityRoles : Set(Role)
securityCompartments : Set(Compartments)
UserProfile
SecureClass
Attributes : Set(OclType)
securitylevels : Levels
securityRoles : Set(Role)
securityCompartments : Set(Compartments)
SConstraint
0..1
0..*
0..1
0..*
AuditRule
AuthorizationRule
SecurityRule
SOID
SDimensionAttribute
SDescriptor
SBase
0..1
0..*
Specializes
0..1
0..*
RollsUp_To
1
0..*
1
0..*
1
1
SFactAttribute
SDegenerate
Dimension
SDegenerat
eFact
1
0..*
1
0..*
SDimension
0..*
1
1
0..*
SFact
1
0..*
1
0..*
1
0..*
Aggreg
Figure 2: Metamodel used in the design of SMD PIM.
As security requirements are modeled in this PIM, it is therefore denomi-
nated as SMD PIM (Secure Multidimensional PIM). In the metamodel SFacts
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are speciﬁed as composed classes by means of aggregation relationships of n SDi-
mensions classes. SDimensions classes are composed of classiﬁcation hierarchy
levels; every classiﬁcation hierarchy level is speciﬁed by an SBase class. An asso-
ciation RollUp To between SBases classes speciﬁes the relationship between two
levels of a classiﬁcation hierarchy. This classiﬁcation hierarchy does not contain
any cycle. The multiplicities deﬁned by an association RollUp To addresses the
concepts of strictness, non-strictness and completeness of a classiﬁcation hier-
archy. The Specializes associations between SBases classes guarantee the cat-
egorization of SDimensions classes represented by generalization-specialization
relationships.
FactAttributes and SDegenerateDimension represent attributes for the SFact
class. SOIDs, SDescriptors, and/or SDimensionAttributes represent SBase at-
tributes. SDegenerateDimension attributes are deﬁned in the SFact. A SDegen-
erateFact represents a UML association class attached to amany-to-many aggre-
gation relationship between an SFact class and an SDimension class, which may
contain SFactAttributes and SDegenerateDimensions. SDegenerateDimension is
an SDimension which is stored as an attribute of the SFact class. SDegenerate-
Dimensions are useful when attempting to associate the SFacts in the DW with
the original data sources. The UserProfile metaclass contains information about
each user’s right of access to the MD model.
The metamodel also allows us to represent the main security information
on data and their constraints in the multidimensional modeling at the concep-
tual level. The security information is based on a combination of the Multilevel
Security Model which allows us to classify both information and users into secu-
rity classes, enforcing the mandatory access control (MAC), together with the
role-based access control (RBAC). For each element of the metamodel (SFact,
SDegenerateFact, etc) its security information is deﬁned in three ways. (i) a se-
quence of security levels (SecurityLevels) that indicates the clearance level of the
user. (ii) A set of user categories (SecurityCompartment) used by an organization
to classify users into a set of horizontal groups, such as geographical location,
area of work, etc. (iii) A set of user roles (SecurityRoles) used by the company to
organize users into a hierarchical role structure, according to the responsibilities
of each type of work. Therefore, the metamodel includes six data types to deﬁne
the tagged values contained within the SecureClass and SecurityProperty classes
in order to establish security information in the systems’ classes (SFact, SBase,
etc). The security information can thus be deﬁned in each instanced object of
the metamodel, thereby specifying with high accuracy which users can access
each particular object.
Additionally, the SFact, SDegenerateFact, SDimension, SBase, SDegenerate-
Dimension, SFactAttribute, SDescriptor, SOID and SDimensionAttribute classes
have security constraints (SConstraint) to indicate the security level and the
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rights conceded to a user who wishes to access certain information. For ex-
ample, an authorization rule (AuthorizationRule) could represent an excep-
tion made to permit speciﬁc users to access certain information. The ac-
cess type may depend on the value of certain attributes contained in sev-
eral classes. This fact can be captured in the model by means of a secu-
rity rule (SecurityRule). If a user attempts to access information to which
his/her access is denied, then this fact can be modeled with an audit rule (Au-
ditRule). These restrictions are deﬁned by using an Object Constraint Lan-
guage (OCL) extension [Ferna´ndez-Medina and Piattini (2004)] and are repre-
sented at model level with a UML note associated with the corresponding class.
More details of this proﬁle can be found in [Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006)]
and [Villarroel et al., (2006)].
3.2 Definition of the SMD PSM
In the design of databases and DWs, conceptual modeling provides the PIM,
and the logical modeling of the PSM. In MD modeling, the logical level is de-
signed according to the speciﬁc properties of the Database Management Sys-
tems (DBMS) such as Relational Online Analytical Processing (ROLAP), MO-
LAP or Hybrid Online Analytical Processing (HOLAP). Nevertheless, Kim-
ball [Kimball and Ross (2002)] assures us that the most common representation
is through the relational platform (ROLAP systems).
It it necessary to consider types of secure PSMs which allow us to represent, at
the logical level, all the security and audit rules captured by using the SECDW
metamodel during the conceptual modeling stage of the DWs. To the best of
our knowledge, the SECRDW metamodel is the only existing extension for the
relational metamodel with which to represent at the logical level all the security
and audit measures captured during the conceptual modeling phase of the DWs
design. Unfortunately, as we stated previously, other metamodels for PSMs such
as MOLAP or HOLAP have to be extended in order to support security issues.
Also, the deﬁnition of the transformation between previous PSMs can be deﬁned
by starting from our QVT transformations.
Our PSM is described by an extension of the Relational Metamodel from
the CWM. The main purpose of the CWM [OMG (2003)] is to enable the easy
interchange of warehouse and business intelligence metadata between warehouse
tools, warehouse platforms and warehouse metadata repositories in distributed
heterogeneous environments. In order to distinguish the security aspects that
the SECRDW metamodel comprises, it will, from here on, be called the Secure
Multidimensional PSM (SMD PSM). See Fig. 3.
The SECRDW metamodel deﬁnes a container SSchema which is inherited
from Schema. See Fig. 3. SSchema is a collection of STables and securityProp-
erties and is aimed at security at the schema (catalog) level. A ColumnSet
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Schema
(from Relational)
UserProfile
AuditConstraint
logType : AccessAttempt
logCond : OCLExpression
logInfo : SetLogInfo
objectCond : OCLExpression
AURConstraint
involvedTables : SetOCLType
sign = {+,-}
action : SetPrivilegeType
objectCond : OCLExpression
subjectID : OCLExpression
subjectCond : OCLExpression
ARConstraint
involvedTables : SetOCLType
objectCond : OCLExpression
ARcond : OCLExpression
subjectCond : OCLExpression
SecurityLevels
SL : Levels
SecurityCompartments
SC : SetCompartmentType
SecurityRoles
SR : SetRoleType
Table
(from Relational)
ColumnSet
(from Relational)
Column
(from Relational)
0..1
*/owned
/feature
NamedColumnSet
(from Relational)
0..1
*
/optionScopeColumnSet
/optionScopeColumn
SSchema
0..1
*
/namespace
/ownedElement
SecurityProperty
0..1
0..*
PrimaryKey
(from Relational)
ForeingKey
(from Relational)
1..*
1 / fk
/ pk
SColumn
0..*
1..3scolumn securityProp
1..*
*
/feature
/keyRelatonship
STable
1
*
*
1..3
0..1
0..1
/namespace
/ownedElement
0..1
*
/namespace
/ownedElement
SecurityConstraint
0..1
0..*
scolumn
securityConst
0..1
0..*
Figure 3: Metamodel used in the design of SMD PSM.
represents any form of relational data. An STable and UserProfile are inher-
ited from Table, which contains Columns. SColumn specializes in the Column
metaclass, and is owned by the STable metaclass. The UserProfile table con-
tains columns through which to specify the access properties (securityProperty)
that the user has. UserProfile, unlike STable, is unique and has no association
with the other tables in the system. A ForeignKey associates columns from one
table with columns from another table. The PrimaryKey class inherits from
the UniqueConstraint. The PrimaryKey and ForeignKey metaclasses are owned
by the STable metaclass. Certain metaclasses are used to represent security
and audit measures in the metamodel. The SecurityProperty metaclass inher-
its from the Class (from the Core) metaclass and specializes in SecurityLevels,
securityCompartments and securityRoles classes. The associations between Secu-
rityProperty with STable and SColumn allow us to establish information security
by means of securityLevel, securityCompartment and securityRole.
Furthermore, SecurityConstraint is used to represent security constraints. Se-
curityConstraint (which inherits from Constraints metaclass) allows us to deﬁne
AuditConstraint, ARConstraint and AURConstraint. AuditConstraint is useful
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both as a deterrent against misbehaviour and as a means to analyze user behav-
iour by employing the system to discover possible attempted or actual violations.
AuditConstraint is essential to record the accesses to tables and columns which
are performed by users. ARConstraint allows us to deﬁne rules with which to
specify multilevel security policies in tables and columns. AURConstraint en-
ables us to specify access to the tables and columns, thus permitting us to
specify much more elaborate security models. The associations between Secu-
rityConstraint with STable and SColumn allow us to establish security rules
by using AuditConstraint, ARConstraint and/or AURConstraint. Moreover, the
SecurityConstraint allows us to express the (AuditRule, AuthorizationRule and
SecurityRule) constraints which are modeled through the UML notes in the
SECDW metamodel (SMD PIM).
3.3 The SMD PIM - SMD PSM QVT relations
Fig. 4 uses textual notation to show the main transformation between SMD
PIM and SMD PSM. The top keyword which precedes the relations speciﬁes
that these relations will never be invoked by any other relations throughout
the transformation. Each of these relations has its own when and where clauses
which correspond (respectively) to the pre and post-conditions which have to be
satisﬁed. We shall now explain the general idea of the transformation shown in
Fig. 4.
The execution of the transformation shown in Fig. 4 ﬁrst calls the relation
(8), then for each secureDW in the SECDW model, the relation ﬁrst checks
whether an SSchema with the same name exists in the SECRDW model, and
if it does not, a new SSchema is created in that model with the given name.
Relation (9) transforms UserProfile with its attributes into a RUserProfile table
with its corresponding columns. Relation (10) is deﬁned in Subsection 3.3.1, and
its main relations invoked in the where clause are explained in subsections 3.3.2
and 3.3.3. We shall not deﬁne the SDegenerateFact2STable relation (see (11)
in Fig. 4) because it is very similar to the SFact2STable. Next, relation (12) is
deﬁned in Subsection 3.3.4 by following the snowﬂake schema paradigm for rep-
resenting DWs at the logical level, as we can see in Subsection 3.3.5 in which we
explain the relations deﬁned in its where clause. Finally, the relations marked
with the numbers (13), (14) and (15) assure the relationships between the STa-
bles corresponding to the SRootBase-SDimension, SFact -SDimension, and SDe-
generateFact -SDimension associations in the SECDW model.
The deﬁnition of the SDimension2STable relation is very interesting, since it
determines the complexity of the QVT transformation. We should note that in
order to build a star schema at the logical level we need to transform the whole
dimension hierarchy into the same STable, i.e, all the security information for
SBases that conform with the SDimension are mapped into the same STable.
1620 Soler E., Trujillo J., Blanco C., Fernandez-Medina E.: Designing ...
Transformation SMD To SREL(SMD: SECDW,) SREL: SECRDW)
{
(1) key Table{name, SSchema};
(2) key Column {name, owner};
(3) key UserProfile{name, SSchema};
(4) key PrimaryKey{name, owner};
(5) key ForeignKey{name, owner};
(6) key SecurityProperty{name, owner};
(7) key SecurityConstraint(name, owner);
(8) top relation SecureDW2SSchema{}
(9) top relation UserProfile2RUserProfile{}
(10) top relation SFact2STable {}
(11) top relation SDegenerateFact2STable{}
(12) top relation SDimension2STable{}
//Association SFact with SDimension
(13) top relation AssocSF_D2FKey{}
//Association SDegenerateFact with SDimension
(14) top relation Assoc SDF_SD2FkeyFKey
// Association SDegenerateFact with SFact
(15) top relation AssocSDF_SF2FKey{}
}
Figure 4: Textual notation for the main Transformation.
Therefore, the complexity of the QVT transformation is increased. Nevertheless,
the transformation can be deﬁned by applying several functions based on tree
structures in the where clause which returns correct security values for STables
and SColumns.
3.3.1 The SFact to STable Transformation
Fig. 5 illustrates the SFact2STable relation in its graphical notation. One table
corresponds to SFact and has the same name. This table has a column with a
name (speciﬁed in the where clause), which is also the primary key of the table.
The security information represented with tagged values in the SFact is trans-
formed into objects associated with the table. This security information is mod-
eled at the logical level under the heading of the SFact table. The SFAct2STable
relation is satisﬁed only when the SecureDW2SSchema pre-condition is satis-
ﬁed, thus ensuring that the table will be contained in a DW SSchema. The
SFact attributes, together with their security information and constraints, are
transformed according to the SFactAttribute2SColumn (if the attribute’s type is
SFactAttribute) or SDegenerateDimension2SColumn (if the attribute is of an
SDegenerateDimension type) relations. Every SFactAttribute involved in the
SFactAttribute2Column relation inherits security information and restrictions
from the SecureProperty class, as the latter contains the SConstraint metaclass.
We shall now deﬁne the SFactAttribute2SColumn relation presented in the where
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<<domain>>
C E
SMD SREL
<<domain>>
SFact2STable
SL= f_sl
Pk: PrimaryKey
name=n_pk
SC= f_sc
t: STable
name= n_f
SR= f_sr
sdw: SecureDW
When
Where
SecureDW2SSchema (sdw,ss);
SFactAttribute2SColumn (f, t);
SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint (f, t);
SDegenerateDimension2SColumn (f, t);
n_c= 'ID'+'_' + n_f; n_pk= 'pk' + '_' + n_f;
ss: SSchema
f: SFact
name= n_f
SL_SF= f_sl
SR_SF= f_sr
SC_SF=f_sc
c: SColumn
name=n_c
type= 'INTEGER'
Figure 5: Transforming SFact into STable.
clause of the SFact2SColumn relation.
3.3.2 The SFactAttribute to SColumn Transformation
Fig. 6 shows the graphical notation for the SFactAttribute2SColumn relation.
Each SFactAttribute inherits information and security restrictions from the Se-
cureProperty class, as this contains the SConstraint metaclass. Hence the SFac-
tAttribute2SColumn not only transforms attributes into columns, but also trans-
forms all the associated security information that the SFactAttribute contains
at the conceptual level. This information is modeled at the logical level next
to each column in the table that represents the SFact. The relation that ap-
pears as a post-condition transforms the security restrictions of each SFactAt-
tribute into an object associated with the corresponding column. This object
is modeled as a note associated with the column. It should be noted that the
SMDType2SRELType () function converts a data type of the initial metamodel
(i.e., Secure DW, SECDW) into a certain data type of the ﬁnal metamodel (i.e.,
Secure Relational DW, SECRDW).
3.3.3 The SFactConstraint to SecurityConstraint Transformation
Let us assume that in the case of the SFactAttribute2SColumn relation, all the
relations of the where clause have been deﬁned. If we return to the content of
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f: SFact
<<domain>>
C E
SMD SREL
<<domain>>
SFactAttribute2SColumn
SL= c_sl SC= c_sc
SR= c_sr
Where
SAttributeConstraint2SecurityConstraint (sfa, n_c);
name= n_sfa
type= t_sfa
SL_SFA= a_sl
SR_SFA= a_sr
SC_SFA= a_sc
sfa: SFactAttribute c: SColumn
name=n_c
type= SRelType
SRelType= SMDType2SRelType (t_sfa);
n_c= n_sfa; c_sl= a_sl; c_sr= a_sr; c_sc= a_sc
t: STable
Figure 6: Transforming SFactAtribute into SColumn.
the post-conditions that appear in the SFact2STable relation, we should now
establish the SConstraint2SecurityConstraint transformation.
Fig. 7 illustrates the graphical notation provided by QVT to deﬁne the SFact-
Constraint2SecurityConstraint relation. Certain attributes have been omitted in
order to make it more comprehensible. When the relation is applied, the Au-
ditRule, AuthorizationRule and SecurityRule constraints are transformed into
AuditConstraint, ARConstraint and AURConstraint respectively, but are now
associated with the table that represents the SFact. It may be noted that this
relation’s where clause employs OCL to ensure that the “s icsr” attribute corre-
sponds to the tables that represent the involvedTables attribute of the ARCon-
straint restriction.
3.3.4 The SDimension to STable Transformation
If we continue with the main transformation that appears in Fig. 4, it now follows
that we apply the SDegenerateFact2STable relation that guarantees a many-to-
many relationship between SFact and SDimension. As we explained previously,
this is not deﬁned. In Fig. 8 we show the deﬁnition of the SDimension2STable
relation. The way in which we deﬁne the SDimension2STable relation deter-
mines the logical schema type in the relational platform (star, factconstellations
or snowﬂake schemas). In our context, we employ the snowﬂake schema. In our
approach, the dimensions do not have attributes [Luja´n et al., (2006)], and for
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<<domain>>
C E
SMD SREL
<<domain>>
SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint
Where
s_OCLar= 'r_OCLar'; …
…s_icsr-> Table,schema -> select(oclIsTypeOf(Table)) -> forAll
(Table.name / r_icsr.collection -> includes (Table.name));
auc: AuditConstraint
t: STable
aur: AURConstraint
ar: ARConstraint
name= r_sr
involvedTables= s_icsr
OCLConstraint=
s_OCLsr
ar: AuditRule
au: AuthorizationRule
f: SFact
sr: SecurityRule
name= r_sr
involvedClasses= r_icsr
OCLConstraint=
r_OCLsr
Figure 7: SFactConstraint to SecurityConstraint Tranformation.
this reason, when the SDimension2STable relation is executed, a table is created
whose name is merged with the names from the dimension and rootBase respec-
tively. The rootBase is the only SBase associated with the SDimension. All of
the security information associated with the rootBase is transformed into the
security properties of the table, and the execution of the relations that appear
in the where clause of the SDimension2STable relation is used to guarantee that
all the attributes of the rootBase will conform to the columns in the table.
3.3.5 The SBase to STable Transformation
Fig. 9 shows the deﬁnition of the SBase2STable relation. This relation creates a
table with both a primary key, and a foreign key in the table which it receives
as a parameter when it is invoked; the primary key and the foreign key will be
associated in order to guarantee that the tables form a part of a one-to-many
relation between the SBases. In the where clause this relation, along with the
SpecializedSBase2STable relation, are re-called to assure that we cover the entire
hierarchy of bases to which the dimension conforms.
The ﬁrst four relations that appear in the where clause of the SBase2STable
relation guarantee the transformation of all the SBase attributes in the columns
of the table that represents the SBase, as well as the transformation of all the con-
straints associated with the SBase in constraints associated with the table that
represents the SBase. The calls to the SBase2STable and SpecializedBase2STable
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CSMD SREL
<<domain>>
SDimension2STable
sdw: SecureDW
Where
SecureDW2SSchema (sdw,ss);
srb: SRootBase
name= n_srb
SL_SF= rsb_sl
SR_SF= rsb_sr
SC_SF= rsb_sc
Pk: PrimaryKey
name=n_pk
SC= rsb_sc
<<domain>>
t: STable
name= n_st
ss: SSchema
c: SColumn
name= n_c
type= 'INTEGER'
E
SL= rsb_sl
When
n_c= 'ID'+'_' + n_sd; n_pk= 'pk' + '_' + n_st; n_st= n_sd +'_'+ n_srb
SRootBaseConstraint2SecurityConstraint (srb, t);
SBase2STable (srb, t);
sd: SDimension
name= n_sd
SDimensionAttribute2SColumn (srb, t);
SOID2SColumn (srb, t);
SDescriptor2SColumn (srb, t);
SpecializedSBase2Table (srb, t);
SR= rsb_sr
Figure 8: Transforming SDimension into STable.
relations permit us to recursively cover all the hierarchy of the bases to which the
dimension conforms. The SpecializedBase2STable relation has a certain similarity
to the SBase2STable relation, and will not therefore be deﬁned. This comment
closes our deﬁnition of both the SBase2SColumn and the SDimension2STable.
3.3.6 Associations to ForeignKeys Transformations
Returning to the transformation shown in Fig. 4, this now corresponds to re-
lations (13), (14) and (15), which map associations from SMD PIM (SFact -
SDimension, SDegenerateFact -SDimension and SDegenerateFact -SDimension)
into the corresponding ForeignKey from SMD PSM. Hence, each relation (i.e,
(13), (14) and (15)) is responsible for adding a foreign key in a previously created
STable. This necessitates retrieving the existing STable. Fig. 10 depicts how the
SFact -SDimension aggregation (relation (12) from Fig. 4) is transformed into a
foreign key (FKey) belonging to the STable mapped from SFact. The FKey is
associated with the PrimaryKey of the STable mapped from SDimension. There-
fore, the transformation assures a many-to-one relationship between the STables
mapped from SFact and SDimension respectively. Relations (14) and (15) from
the main transformation shown in Fig. 4 are similar to the relation deﬁned in
Fig. 10. These relations establish a many-to-one relationship between both the
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CSMD SREL
<<domain>>
SBase2STable
b1: SBase
SDescriptor2SColumn (b2, t2);
b2: SBase
name= n_sb
SL_SF= sb_sl
SR_SF= sb_sr
SC_SF= sb_sc
Pk: PrimaryKey
name=n_pk
SC= sb_sc
<<domain>>
t2: STable
name= n_sb c: SColumn
name= n_c
type= 'INTEGER'
E
SL= sb_sl
SDimensionAttribute2SColumn (b2, t2);
SOID2SColumn (b2, t2);
n_c= 'ID'+'_' + n_sb; n_pk= 'pk' + '_' + n_sb; fn_c= 'REF_' + n_c
SBase2STable (b2, t2);
SR= sb_sr
SpecializedSBase2STable (b2, t2);
SBaseConstraint2SecurityConstraint (b2, t2);
t1: STable
c: SColumn
name= fn_c
type= 'INTEGER'c: FKey
name= n_pk
Where
Figure 9: Transforming SBase into STable.
STables mapped from SDegenerateFact and SDimension and SDegenerateFact
and SFact respectively. Hence, they are not deﬁned.
3.4 Implementing the SMD PIM - SMD PSM transformation
In this subsection, we brieﬂy explain how the transformations T2 and T3 shown
in Fig. 1 can be implemented. Due to space constraints, we shall only refer to
the complexity of implementing QVT relations in implementing platforms and
the platform we have used. As has already been described, we have deﬁned QVT
relations in order to transform the SMD PIM into the SMD PSM.
However, one of the current pitfalls in using QVT is how to implement its re-
lationships. As we have previously stated, the declarative and imperative styles
conform to the QVT speciﬁcation. In our proposal we have chosen the QVT
declarative approach, since it is more understandable than the imperative one.
However, there is no available QVT transformation engine that allows us to di-
rectly implement these declarative QVT relations. One solution is that of deriv-
ing an imperative version of these declarative relations and implementing these
imperative QVT relations in an imperative QVT engine such as that provided
by the Eclipse platform [Borland (2007)].
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<<domain>>
C E
SMD SREL
AssocSF_SD2FKey
Pk: PrimaryKey
name= n_pk
tf: STable
Where
SFact2STable (n_f, tf); SDimension2STable (n_f, td);
n_c= 'ID' + '_' + n_sd; n_fk= 'FK'+'_'+ n_sd;
f: SFact
name= n_f
: SColumn
<<domain>>
: Aggregation
sd: SDimension
name= n_sd
c: SColumn
name=n_c
type= 'INTEGER'
fk: FKey
name=n_fk
td: STable
When
Figure 10: Transforming SFact -SDim aggregation into FKey.
Eclipse is a platform which supports MDA and allows us to use the QVT
language in order to implement transformations between models. We have also
used the SmartQVT open source [SmartQVT (2007)] within the Eclipse plat-
form in order to correctly implement the imperative part of our QVT relations.
Therefore, we have translated our declarative relations described in Section 3
into their corresponding imperative versions in an absolutely straightforward
way according to the QVT speciﬁcation [OMG (2005)].
Fig. 11 shows a snapshot of the Eclipse platform for modeling the case study
described in the following section. The Plug-in we have developed allows us to
model secure DWs by using our proposed PIM. The corresponding QVT and
Model to Text relations will thus allow us to obtain the ﬁnal implementation of
the DW together with their corresponding speciﬁed secure rules.
3.5 SMD PSM - MSD Code for DBMS
This subsection brieﬂy shows the possibilities that Oracle 11g DBMS oﬀers in
implementing the main aspects of the security issues represented in SMD PSM
[Jeloka (2007)]. Oracle 11g supports security and audit facilities by means of its
components, namely Oracle Label Security (OLS11g), Virtual Private Databases
(VPD) and Oracle Fine-Grained Auditing (FGA).
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Figure 11: An Eclipse snapshot using our approach.
OLS11g deﬁnes labels that contain conﬁdentially for rows, and authorization
information for users. All security information speciﬁed in OLS11g has to be
performed within the context of a security policy. This mechanism is called a
labeling function and deﬁnes the information of the security label according to
the value of the columns of the rows that are inserted or updated. Once the
security policies have been deﬁned, they are applied to tables and attributes
in order to assure information conﬁdentiality. VPD allows us to restrict access
to speciﬁc rows in a table. What is more, VPD can be used to deﬁne a policy
function which will allow any individual user to see a completely diﬀerent set of
data, which consists only of the data that a particular user is authorized to see.
FGA allows us to deﬁne and implement policies through which to audit select,
update, insert and delete statements in tables and views according to an audit
condition.
Since OLS 11g manages the main security concepts speciﬁed by our logical
models, the transformation from the logical level into SMD code for this tool
can be easily obtained. That is, OLS 11g permits a classiﬁcation of subjects and
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objects in security levels, roles and compartments, along with the speciﬁcation
of security constraints. However, other tools need more complex procedures to
transform our logical concepts into ﬁnal code. The current proposal from OMG
used to deﬁne the transformations model-to-code is the “MOF Model to Text
Transformation Language RF”.
The steps needed to implement a secure DW in OLS 11g are the following:
(1) the deﬁnition of a security policy; (2) the establishment of the systems’s
security conﬁguration by creating the security levels, compartments and roles
needed; (3) the deﬁnition of labeling functions for each security constraint by
establishing the security compartments, levels and roles which can access the
information; and (4) the application of the deﬁned security policies in the DW
tables.
3.6 SMD PSM - MSD Code for OLAP tools
Apart from the generation of the corresponding Code to automatically imple-
ment the Security rules in a DBMS (as is shown in the previous section), our
MDA architecture also supports the automatic generation of the Code in order
to generate the secure required information for OLAP tools. In this section, we
will focus on MOLAP (Multidimensional OLAP) tools, which are based on pro-
prietary multidimensional models based on cubes and hierarchies of dimensions
and base classes. In order to provide this information, we need: (1) to create a
new PSM metamodel focused on a MOLAP approach; (2) to deﬁne the auto-
matic transformation from conceptual models (PIM) to multidimensional logical
models (PSM); and (3) to implement the logical model in a speciﬁc OLAP tool
and to deﬁne transformation rules from PSM models to code.
SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS) has been selected as the target OLAP
tool to be used for our multidimensional implementation because it allows se-
curity measures to be deﬁned in multidimensional structures. SSAS uses a role-
based security policy in which each role contains one or more speciﬁc user ac-
counts or user groups. These roles are used to establish security constraints
for metadata and multidimensional elements, permitting: administrative autho-
rizations for processing a database, cube, dimension or mining structure; read
authorizations on metadata which show or hide deﬁnitions of databases, cubes,
dimensions or mining structures; and access control through which to grant or
revoke user accesses to data sources, cubes, cell data, dimensions, dimension
data, and mining structures. We can also deﬁne more complex access control
constraints involving conditions at a ﬁne-grain level by establishing Multidimen-
sional Expression (MDX) with permitted and denied sets.
The “Visual Totals” property is another interesting characteristic of SSAS,
which ﬁlters the aggregate values in order to calculate them by using only the
visible elements with regard to the deﬁned security measures for the role. SSAS
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also allows us to control inferences on derived cells by deﬁning contingence per-
missions for read accesses. Cell data can therefore only be shown if we have read
permissions over all the cells from which they are derived. Finally, SSAS oﬀers
data auditing capabilities which include audit objects, auditing DDL commands
and support for multiple logging targets.
Therefore, once the multidimensional logical model (PSM) has been obtained,
the ﬁrst step towards implementing a secure DW in SSAS is to deﬁne a hierarchy
of roles which establish the security conﬁguration of the system by means of a
role-based policy. The security constraints deﬁned over the multidimensional
elements must then be implemented as permissions related to the corresponding
cubes, cells, dimensions or attributes. Sets of positive and negative permissions
for authorized and unauthorized roles are therefore created for each security
constraint. More complex security rules that involve condition evaluations are
also implemented by permissions, but in this case, the condition to be evaluated
is included as a denied or permitted set a by using multidimensional expression
(MDX).
3.7 Modernization processes
Reverse engineering analyzes legacy systems, identifying the system’s elements
and their interrelationships and carrying out representations of the system at a
higher level of abstraction. MDA provides the necessary formalization with which
to reengineer a process for it to converge on the so-called Architecture-Driven
Modernization (ADM), another OMG initiative [OMG (2006)]. ADM advocates
reengineering processes in which each artifact involved in these processes is de-
picted and managed as a model [Khusidman and Ulrich (2007)].
Our MDA architecture is being fulﬁlled with an ADM process focused on
the multidimensional path which allows us to automatically obtain higher ab-
straction models (PIM) from OLAP code [Mazo´n et al., (2007)]. In a ﬁrst stage,
the according multidimensional logical model (PSM) is obtained from the source
code of the OLAP tool by applying a static analysis [Canfora and Penta (2007)],
which is a reengineering method based on the generation of lexical and syntac-
tical analyzers for the speciﬁc tool. Code ﬁles are thus analyzed and a set of
code-to-model transformations create the corresponding elements in the target
logical model. Once the logical multidimensional model (PSM) has been ob-
tained, several sets of QVT rules carry out a model-to-model transformation
towards the corresponding conceptual model (PIM).
The modernizing of DWs provides us with various beneﬁts, such as theabil-
ity to generate diagrams in a high abstraction level (PIM) in order to facilitate
the identiﬁcation of security lacks and to include new security constraints which
solve these identiﬁed problems. Transformation rules can be then applied, thus
1630 Soler E., Trujillo J., Blanco C., Fernandez-Medina E.: Designing ...
obtaining an improved logical model and the ﬁnal implementation. By follow-
ing the MDA philosophy the system can also migrate to diﬀerent technologies
(MOLAP, ROLAP, HOLAP, etc.) and diﬀerent ﬁnal tools (SSAS, OLS, etc.).
4 Applying QVT relations - a case study
This section explains how the deﬁned relations are applied. If we suppose that
a hospital wishes to automate its patient admission process, then the type of
information involved requires conﬁdentiality.
Fig. 12 shows an instance of the SECDW metamodel, (i.e., SMD PIM) to
illustrate the part of the data warehouse that is required to solve the afore-
mentioned problem. The instance of the SECDW uses the Level, Levels and
Role data types deﬁned in [Villarroel et al., (2006)]. The data types allow us to
deﬁne the SecurityLevels and SecurityRoles tagged values depicted in Fig. 12
with SL and SR respectively. Furthermore, the SecurityRule is presented by fol-
lowing the syntax for sensitivity information assignment rules (SIARs) deﬁned
in [Ferna´ndez-Medina et al., (2006)].
The levels of security (SL) employed in the case study are confidential, secret
and topSecret. The user roles (SR) might be Health (including Doctor and Nurse)
and notHealth (including the Administrative and Maintenance roles). The root
of this hierarchy is HospitalEmployee. The user categories have not been con-
sidered in this example. The SFact Admission (stereotype S ) contains all the
individual patient admissions, and can be acceded by users who have secret or
topSecret security levels and who play a role in Administrative or Health. The
SFact Admission contains two SDimensions (Admission and Patient) (stereo-
type S). Access to these SBase (stereotype S) hierarchies is established by
employing the same procedure that was used with the SFact. The UserProfile
(stereotype ) metaclass contains information about all the users who will have
access to this secure MD model.
If any instance of the Admission fact class or the Patient dimension class is
queried, and if the admission type is a primary diagnosis, then the security role
will be Doctor and Admin, otherwise it will be Doctor, Nurse, and Admin. A pri-
mary diagnosis(1) is considered to be the most important reason for treatment,
while secondary diagnosis(2) completes the view of the patient’s condition. This
restriction is speciﬁed by means of a SecurityRule.
The application of the main transformation (see Fig. 4) in the case of this
example begins with the application of the SecureDW2SSchema relation which
transforms the Hospital package into an Admission schema, whilst simultane-
ously deﬁning the tagged values. The proposal of [Soler et al., (2008)] guarantees
that the original tagged values from SMD PIM can be represented in equivalent
instances of metaclasses from the extended Relational Metamodel from CWM.
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DataD {SL= S; RS= Health}
SOID codeDiagnosis
SD description
SDA healthArea
SDA validFrom
SDA validTo
<<SecurityRule>>
{invMDClasses MDCL Patient}
{SiarCondself.SR = if self.type = 1 then
{'Doctor', 'Admin'}
else {'Doctor', 'Nurse', 'Admin'}
endif}
userProfile
userCode
securityLevel
citizenship
hospital
workingArea
dateContract
Diagnosis
Admission {SL= S..TS; RS=
Health, Admin}
SFA type
SFA cost {SR= Admin}
0..*
1
Patient
0..*
1
DataP {SL= S; RS= Health,
Admin}
SOID ssn
SD name
SDA dateOfBirth
SDA address {RS= Admin}
Figure 12: Example of Modeling Secure Multidimensional.
The UserProfile2RUserProfile relation guarantees that the Schema contains a
table whose columns correspond with the attributes of the UserProfile meta-
class. Fig. 13 illustrates the result of applying the SFact2STable relation. The
SFact Admission is transformed into the Admission STable, which contains as a
primary key the column ID of type Number and the SL and SR objects which
specify the users who will have access to this type of information.
Admission
Hospital:
SSchema
ID_Admission:
SColumn
PK_Admission:
PrimaryKey
Hospital
S
Admission:
STable
SR= {Health, Admin}
SL= {S..TS}
SFA Type: string
SFA cost: currency
Integer:
SQLSimpleType
SFact2STable
Figure 13: Transforming SFact into STable.
The SFactAttribute2SColumn relation appears in the where clause of the
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SFact2STable relation. This relation transforms the attributes of the SFact Ad-
mission into columns of the Admission table. In Fig. 14 we assume that the
SFactAttribute2SColumn relation is performed, hence the Admission table ap-
pears with these columns.
If we continue with the relations that appear in the where clause of the
SFact2STable, we should now apply the SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint re-
lation. Fig. 14 presents a SecurityRule which is transformed into an ARCon-
SFA Type: string
SFA cost: currency
Admission
SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint
<<SecurityRule>>
{invMDClasses MDCL Patient}
{SiarCond self.SR = if self.type=
1 then {'Doctor', 'Admin'}
else {'Doctor', 'Nurse', 'Admin'}
endif}
ID_Admission: Integer
type: string
cost: float
Admission: Table
SL= {S..TS}
SR= {Health, Admin}
<<ARConstraint>>
{InvTables= Patient }
{Arcond self.SL= if self.type= 1
then 'Doctor, Admin'TS
else 'Doctor, Nurse, Admin'
endif}
Figure 14: Transforming SFactConstraint into SecurityConstraint.
straint associated with the Admission STable. Note the representation of the
access levels which were previously transformed by means of the SFact2STable
in the table heading. Let us begin with Fig. 14. Here we clarify that the con-
straints could be changed depending upon the transformation type between class
and table (OCLExpression).
According to the SDimension2STable relation (see Fig. 8) the SDimensions
Diagnosis and Patient, along with their security information, are transformed
into the Patient DataP and Diagnosis DataD tables respectively. Finally, the
Admission, Patient DataP and Diagnosis DataD tables are related according to
the AssocSF D2FKey relation.
It is now easy to obtain the code for a secure platform such as Oracle 11g
[Jeloka (2007)]. Firstly, the security conﬁguration is set up as Fig. 15 shows.
A security policy called “MyPolicy” and a hidden column called “MyLabel”,
which stores information about labels, are created. Furthermore, since DWs are
not modiﬁed by users, the user privileges are established to read access.
The security conﬁguration is then established by using security levels and
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CREATE_POLICY(‘MyPolicy, ’MyLabel’, ‘HIDE’);
SET_USER_PRIVS(‘MyPolicy’, ‘User1’, ‘READ’);
CREATE_LEVEL(‘MyPolicy, 1, ‘LTS’, ‘topSecret’);
CREATE_LEVEL(‘MyPolicy, 2, ‘LS’, ‘Secret’);
CREATE_LEVEL(‘MyPolicy, 3, ‘LC’, ‘Confidential’);
SET_LEVELS(‘MyPolicy, ‘User1’, ‘LTS’, ‘LC’, ‘LS’, ‘LS’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 1, ‘GHE’, ‘HospitalEmployee’, NULL);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 2, ‘GH’, ‘Health’, ‘GHE’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 3, ‘GNH’, ‘nonHealth’, ‘GHE’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 4, ‘GD’, ‘Doctor’, ‘GH’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 5, ‘GN’, ‘Nurse’, ‘GH’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 6, ‘GA’, ‘Administrative’, ‘GNH’);
CREATE_GROUP(‘MyPolicy, 7, ‘GM’, ‘Maintenance’, ‘GNH’);
SET_GROUPS(‘MyPolicy, ‘User1’, ‘GHE, GH, GNH, GD, GN, GA, GM’, NULL, ‘GHE, GH, GNH,
GD, GN, GA, GM’, ‘GHE, GH, GNH, GD, GN, GA, GM’);
Figure 15: Security conﬁguration.
roles. In order to establish the security levels, each security level (“topSecret”,
“Secret” and “Conﬁdential”) has to be created by “CREATED LEVEL”, as-
signing short and long names to the level. Once the levels have been created,
“SET LEVELS” deﬁnes the level used as maximum (“topSecret”), as minimal
(“Conﬁdential”), by default (“Conﬁdential”) and for row access (“Conﬁdential”).
The hierarchy of security roles is deﬁned by “CREATING GROUP” state-
ments which, for each role, establish short and long names, and its root’s name.
Finally, “SET GROUP” establishes sets of roles permitted for read operations
(all), write operations (since we only manage read operations this ﬁeld is null),
by default (all) and for row access (all). Although security compartments have
not been considered in this example, OLS 11g also support their speciﬁcation by
using the “CREATE COMPARTMENT” and “SET COMPARTMENT” state-
ments.
Once the security policy and security conﬁguration have been deﬁned, it
is necessary to create labeling functions which indicate values for the labels
depending on the security rules established and then apply this security policy
to the corresponding tables.
Fig. 16 deﬁnes two labeling functions for the security policy and applies
them to the “Admission” table. The ﬁrst establishes that the “Admission” table
can only be accessed by users with a “Secret” (or higher) security level and a
“Health” or “Administrative” security role (or their descendant roles such as
“Doctor” or “Nurse”). The second implements the “ARConstraint” associated
with “Admission”, in which the value of the “type” attribute determines the
security requirements needed to access the information. If the value of “type”
is “1”, then it can only be accessed by “Admission” table users with a “Secret”
(and higher) security level and “Doctor” or “Administrative” security role (or
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their descendants), but if “type” has a diﬀerent value, users with the “Nurse”
security role are also allowed access. Finally, Fig. 17 creates labeling functions for
“DataD” and “DataP” tables and applies the policy. Both tables can be accessed
by users with a “Secret” (or higher) security level and a “Health” security role
(or its descendants), and “DataP” can also be read by “Administrative” role.
CREATE FUNCTION FunctionAdmission1 (type: Varchar2(20))
Return LBSCSYS.LABC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
MyLabel:=‘Secret::Health,Administrative’;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL (‘MyPolicy’, ‘MyLabel’);
End;
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY (‘MyPolicy’, ‘Admission’, ‘Scheme’, ‘FunctionAdmission1’);
CREATE FUNCTION FunctionAdmission2 (type: Varchar2(20))
Return LBSCSYS.LABC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
If type = ‘1’ then MyLabel:=‘Secret::Doctor,Administrative’;
Else MyLabel:=‘Secret::Doctor,Nurse,Administrative’;
Endif;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL (‘MyPolicy’, ‘MyLabel’);
End;
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY (‘MyPolicy’, ‘Admission’, ‘Scheme’, ‘FunctionAdmission1’);
Figure 16: Labeling functions for Admission table.
CREATE FUNCTION FunctionDataD1 (type: Varchar2(20))
Return LBSCSYS.LABC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
MyLabel:=‘Secret::Health;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL (‘MyPolicy’, ‘MyLabel’);
End;
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY (‘MyPolicy’, ‘DataD’, ‘Scheme’, ‘FunctionDataD1’);
CREATE FUNCTION FunctionDataP1 (type: Varchar2(20))
Return LBSCSYS.LABC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
MyLabel:=‘Secret::Health,Administrative;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL (‘MyPolicy’, ‘MyLabel’);
End;
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY (‘MyPolicy’, ‘DataP’, ‘Scheme’, ‘FunctionDataP1’);
Figure 17: Labeling functions for DataP and DataD tables.
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5 Applicability and limitations of the Architecture
One of the most interesting advantages of our MDA based proposal is the fact
that once the DW has been completely developed, any new security require-
ment can be easily integrated into the models, providing an excellent schema
evolution approach. Our proposal allows designers to modify any detail of an ex-
istent model, and generate the data warehouse for the target platform through
the model transformations deﬁned between models, and through model to code
transformation. The transformations are automatic, but obviously the designer
has to make some design decisions, since we deal with models at diﬀerent abstrac-
tion levels, and the semantic power decreases as we go down in our architecture.
In fact, high abstraction level models (i.e. requirements or multidimensional)
tend to be much more expressive than low level models (i.e. logical or ﬁnal
tools), and some semantic loss is provoked when our top-down transformation is
performed, which is dealt by our transformation rules. For instance, our multi-
dimensional model supports several grouping methods for users (security levels,
roles and compartments). However, SQL Server Analysis Services only support
security roles, so our QVT rules transform high level user groups into platform
dependent user groups.
We consider our approach to be applicable and eﬀective in the design and
implementation of secure data warehouses but this, however, depends on the
target platform we choose to implement our data warehouse. This limitation is
clear for any MDA implementation, since the high level models will eventually be
implemented through a speciﬁc platform which does not support all the concepts
deﬁned in these models. However, the fact of modeling security requirements
within high level models has an important consequence, which is the better
understanding and modeling of the problem, in order to ﬁnd the best solution,
through the best ﬁnal tool. The chosen ﬁnal tool will probably not directly
support the security solutions for these requirements, but will probably have
functionalities to oﬀer ad-hoc solutions to these requirements. We are attempting
to reduce this limitation with the integration of reverse engineering capabilities in
our architecture. This possibility will allow us to change the target platform and
even the logical paradigm of our data warehouse, thanks to the formal deﬁnition
of the metamodels, and thanks to the direct and reverse QVT transformations.
We believe that the types of security speciﬁcations we have included in the ar-
chitecture are complete and suﬃciently ﬂexible to specify the necessary security
requirements for data warehouses. In our research we consider only conﬁdential-
ity, despite the fact that most traditional deﬁnitions of security also consider
integrity and availability as key components. We do not integrate availability
in our data warehouse modeling because this is a requirement that should be
solved by the target platform, and because there are no relevant design decisions
through which to ensure the availability of the data warehouses. Moreover, pro-
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tecting the integrity of the information is important, but mainly for information
which can be modiﬁed or destroyed, while the typical use of the information
in data warehouses is that of query. Nonetheless, we believe that conﬁdential-
ity constraints should be integrated into the data warehouse design, and that
relevant design decisions can be made to improve the conﬁdentiality of informa-
tion stored into a data warehouse. We can therefore consider three technologies
that have been widely used to protect information against improper disclosure
or modiﬁcations. Authentication, access control and audit jointly provide the
foundation for information conﬁdentiality. Authentication establishes the iden-
tity of one party to another. Access control determines what one party will allow
another one to do with regard to the resources and objects mediated by the for-
mer. Access control usually requires authentication as a prerequisite. The Audit
process gathers the data related to the activities in the system and analyzes
them in order to discover security violations or to diagnose their cause. How-
ever, authentication is a mechanism that is design-independent and relies more
on the company’s policies and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this research.
Nevertheless, access control and audit have an important design component,
and these are the types of security requirements that we integrate into the data
warehouse design approach.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper introduces a new framework for the design of secure DWs based on
MDA and QVT. The application of QVT transformation rules to the SMD PIM
permits the development of diﬀerent SMD PSMs, thus facilitating the represen-
tation of all security and audit requirements, captured during the earlier stages
of the DW design, at a logical level. The greatest contribution of this work is that
all the security and audit requirements are modeled at a conceptual level from
the early stages of development. The use of QVT thus makes them more suitable
for the end user, and the time and eﬀort invested in the development of DWs are
therefore shortened, and the security rules are closer to the end user and allow
him/her to obtain the corresponding code for a relational platform. Secondly,
the transition between diﬀerent models and the ﬁnal implementation is guaran-
teed, and we attain interoperability, portability, adaptability and reusability by
employing MDA technology.
Our immediate future work consists of improving the early version of the se-
cure Computation Independent Model (CIM) to represent security requirements
of DWs presented in [Soler et al., (2008a)] by using the i* framework and deﬁn-
ing a secure CIM - secure PIM transformation. Our long term intentions are to
study the possibility of implementing a tool which includes the SMD PIM, the
SMD PSM, the QVT transformations and the code generation process.
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After concluding our complete direct and reverse engineering approach, we
shall deﬁne a quality framework in order to evaluate the quality of the model
transformations. This will allow us to discover the semantic loss which each
transformation in our architecture provokes, and therefore permit us to chose
the path which best respects the conceptual requirements.
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